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Chapter 1. Introduction. 
In 2016, Ukraine faces multiple problems in terms of its divided identity, corrupted 
elites, poor economy and hostile Russia on its eastern borders. Proper understanding of 
Ukrainian complex identity-building process requires some familiarity with history of the 
USSR and its management of nationalities, although, certainly Ukraine had possessed a huge 
historical legacy long before the USSR and that also had influenced its cultural memory. 
Ukraine can be compared with many other post-communist states that these days are divided 
between Soviet mentality and modern nation-building but it is also sort of unique because of 
its geographical position on the crossroads of Western and Russian civilizational influences. 
Geopolitics has always been important to Ukraine’s national identification. However, it 
should not imply that Ukraine has been only an object of contestation between Russia and 
the EU and not an actor on its own as some neo-realists would say as, for example, John 
Mearsheimer who has suggested it was West who provoked Russia’s aggression to maintain 
its sphere of influence in Ukraine.1 Geopolitics is certainly important to Ukrainian future but 
it is still not as decisive as domestic politics and reforms that country has been undergoing 
since Euromaidan. 
Russia’s involvement in modern Ukraine has been contradictory to say the least and it is hard 
not to give acknowledgement to Ukrainian nation for finally rejecting Russian paternalism 
and cultural influence that under Vladimir Putin has obtained neo-imperialist and 
authoritarian colors. After all, Russia had supported pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs from 
Yanukovych’s regime by giving them loans perpetuating further corruption and in general 
giving political leverage to people who were traditionally associated in Ukraine with 
                                                 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked 
Putin,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-
18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault; also response by Alexander J. Motyl, “The Ukraine crisis according to 
John J. Mearsheimer: Impeccable Logic, Wrong Facts,” European Leadership Network, October 31, 2014, 
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-ukraine-crisis-according-to-john-j-mearsheimer-impeccable-
logic-wrong-facts_2079.html 
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organized crime.2 But of course nothing has damaged Ukrainian state as badly as Russian-
Ukrainian crisis 2014 (here refers to the state of Russian-Ukrainian relationship following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014) that has had devastating effect on Ukrainian 
economy, political development and nearly resulting in civil war in eastern regions with mass 
outflows of refugees. At the same time, there has been an argument that Russia’s aggression 
could have contributed to democratic consolidation in Ukraine by weakening long-lasting 
identity split between pro-Western/nationalist and pro-Russian supporters that has been 
considered as impediment to democratic transition in modern Ukraine. In this regard it would 
be useful to turn to the experience of Central and Eastern Europe and their success in 
undergoing post-communist transition by re-instating pre-communist national identities. A 
large part of this success was owned to the nation-wide rejection of communist ideology as 
hostile that had attempted to supersede national identities, cultures and languages. Such 
feeling of resentment has always existed in western regions of Ukraine but following 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis it has gained national dimension. Post-Crimean identification of 
Ukraine would be based first of all on sober realization that it has severed its ties with Russia 
and has chosen a distinctly different way from the rest of post-communist world.   
A lot has been said about how West has failed to prevent Ukrainian crisis and foresee 
annexation of Crimea. The European Union (EU) has been criticized for miscalculating 
strength of Russia’s commitment of not allowing European integration in the east and 
maintaining its sphere of influence in former Soviet Union (FSU). However, it has also been 
said that Vladimir Putin is a great opportunist so in many ways annexation of Crimea and 
Donbass’s separatism have been reactionary moves on Russia’s behalf.3 It was genuinely 
hard to foresee that in the middle of winter Olympic games 2014, while Moscow as a host 
was enjoying triumph and international recognition, Putin would decide to make a such bold 
move and break all international norms and laws. And after the Crimea, the process hardly 
                                                 
2 Taras Kuzio, “Crime, politics and business in 1990s Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Politics 47, 
2014, 195-210. 
3 “Carl Bildt: Putin bol’she opportunist chem strateg,” Ukrinform, June 20, 2015, 
http://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-lastnews/1856632-
bildt_putin_bolshe_opportunist_chem_strateg_1756941.html 
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could have been stopped. Russia has been centralized authoritarian state where decisions are 
made by small group of people who can implement any radical solution without any 
bureaucracy or parliamentary discussions as it has been demonstrated on the example of 
Crimea. The EU, on the other hand, has not been suited for producing quick responses during 
crisis situations due to its bureaucracy and lack of central authority.  
In terms of the EU not understanding Russia’s lack of intentions to become part of Western 
world, Russia’s agenda has changed more than a few times and there were periods when 
Russia was quite pro-Western. As Michael McFaul former US ambassador to Russia used to 
say there were times when Russia cooperated closely with NATO and was not portraying it 
as enemy or a threat.4 It is truth especially if to remember that Russia supported the US 
military operation in Afghanistan following 9/11 and even allowed for the US military bases 
in Central Asia. So at least for some period of time Russia saw itself as part of Western world 
and was not going to confront it. As many experts say these later anti-Western changes are 
likely to be linked to the domestic situation in Russia and growing concerns of Putin with 
regime survival when many weaknesses of domestic policy-making have been hidden under 
prominent foreign policy and external enemies. Therefore, it is not likely that Russia is going 
to genuinely cooperate with the EU in order to resolve Ukrainian crisis. Similar to Georgia 
and Moldova, Putin is likely going to continue support secessionist elements in order to have 
groups of influence and being able to destabilize situation in Ukraine. 
There are two research questions present in this work. The main research question aims to 
explore how pro-Western vs. pro-Russian regional split in Ukraine has changed since the 
beginning of crisis in March 2014 and whether there have been significant shifts towards 
Ukraine’s integration with the European Union in regions that have traditionally supported 
integration with Russia resulting in less regional division and emerging consensus about pro-
democratic path Ukraine should follow. The methodology for the first research question 
involves analysis of voting preferences during Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary 
                                                 
4 Michael McFaul, “Confronting Putin’s Russia,” The New York Times, March 23, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/opinion/confronting-putins-russia.html 
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elections 2014 and local elections 2015 and surveys that measured changes in attitude of 
Ukrainians towards integration with the EU and Russia-led the Customs Union (CU). The 
second research question is concerned with state of democratic consolidation in Ukraine 
analyzing post-conflict party system and mass attitudes towards democracy. The 
methodology for second question is focused on the literature review of Ukrainian post-crisis 
political party system and public surveys that measured change in democratic support during 
the conflict period. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 expands on the background of the research 
question introducing historic context of Ukrainian identity split. Chapter 3 introduces review 
of Russia’s involvement in Ukrainian political scene focusing on 2004 Orange Revolution 
and 2014 Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Chapter 4 introduces theoretical background of the 
research such as relationship between democratic transition, consolidation and national 
identification and how to define and measure democratic consolidation. Chapter 5 introduces 
in details methodology and data used for both research questions. Chapter 6 is exploration of 
shift in Ukrainian national identity and how it has affected identity split using data from latest 
Ukrainian elections and public surveys. Chapter 7 is summary of second research question 
that looks at the state of democratic consolidation in Ukraine choosing two main indicators 
political party system in post-crisis Ukraine and public support of democracy as the only 
form of governance. Chapter 8 or Conclusion is analysis of findings from both research 
questions and their interpretation within theories of democratic consolidation and national 
identification. 
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Chapter 2. Ukrainian Nation-Building, Regionalism and Identity Split. 
One of the most prominent political features of Ukraine has been its regionalism or 
regional division used by political analysts to describe salient differences in political culture 
and voting preferences of various regions of Ukraine. Ukraine’s regional division represents 
two major groups of population with two very different sets of political culture variously 
distributed across the country: “pro-Russian” supporters as those who prefer integration with 
the Customs Union and positively view Russia and “pro-Western/pro-Ukrainian” ones who 
support political integration with the West and more often than not are associated with 
nationalist discourses.  
In many ways this divide is a legacy of Soviet history and specifics of nationalities policies 
in Soviet republics which shifted from encouragement of local ethnicities, culture and 
language during korenizatsia policy in 1920-30s to harsh repressions and history revisionism 
in later periods.5 The Soviet Union has often been considered as an empire with its 
management of nationalities resembling such of the Ottoman Empire where there was a 
blurred distinction between core imperial nation and the rest of empire that underplayed 
ethnic element in favor of emphasizing greater imperial identity.6 Following this logic Soviet 
nationalist policies aimed at assimilation of Slav nations of Ukraine and Belarus into greater 
Russian one with strong promotion of myth of one greater Russian nation to ensure futility 
of any future movements for independence of these nations.7 Traditional Soviet 
historiography and way of thinking remain influential in Ukraine and other post-Soviet 
nation-states that according to official Soviet narrative were never annexed or conquered but 
voluntary joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This narrative harshly contrasts 
                                                 
5 More detailed information on cycles of Ukrainization and Rusification in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine 
can be found in Taras Kuzio, “Competing National Identities and Democratisation in Ukraine: The Fifth and 
Sixth Cycles in post-Soviet Ukrainian History,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 33, 2013, 27-46. 
6 Following definition suggested by Michael Doyle that what defines empire is “relationship, formal or 
informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society” in 
Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 45. 
7 Kuzio, “Competing National Identities and Democratisation in Ukraine: The Fifth and Sixth Cycles in post-
Soviet Ukrainian History”. 
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with nationalist groups of Ukrainians that resent Soviet rule and support complete autonomy 
of Ukrainian nation with its own language, culture and political future.  
The contradictory legacy of imperial transition is one major factor responsible for what has 
often been called “east-west” divide between pro-Russian eastern and central and more 
Ukrainian-oriented western regions that became especially popular during 2004 presidential 
elections and the following “Orange Revolution” often depictured as a clash between “blue” 
regions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea that supported pro-Russian candidate Viktor 
Yanukovych and pro-Western “orange” supporters in Kyiv and western Ukraine that voted 
for Viktor Yushchenko. “Two-region” framework, however, is commonly criticized as an 
oversimplified approach towards the regional division which does not accurately reflect 
distribution of political preferences across the country such as for example southwestern 
regions of Ukraine that do not fall within “western” political behavior and Crimea.8 There is 
more than one factor accounting for regional division in Ukraine reflecting not only 
geography and language (as could have been observed during Russian-Ukrainian crisis when 
majority of Ukrainian Security Services were Russian speakers) but also history, cultural 
orientation and economic factors.9 “Eight-region” approach suggested by Lowell Barrington 
and Erik Herron is less common than “two-region” (east vs. west) or “four-region” (east, 
west, center and south), however, it proves to be more useful in defining units within Ukraine 
with consistent political and social identities. Barrington-Herron’s “eight-region” model 
breaks traditional four regions into smaller units in order to demonstrate eight distinct sets of 
cohesive attitudes and behavior coming from different history, economy and demographic 
indicators that are often blurred and overlooked in “two-” and “four-region” models. Such 
detailed approach has already been partly justified during Russian-Ukrainian crisis when pro-
Russian military separatism managed to gain mass support in Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
but failed in other eastern provinces such as Kharkiv that is usually also portrayed as “east” 
                                                 
8 Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron, “One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political 
Consequences,” Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (2004): 53-86. 
9 Taras Kuzio, “A New Framework for Understanding Nationalisms in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, 
Separatism and Russian Hybrid War,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 7, no. 1 (2015): 30-
51. 
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in “two-” and “four-region” models.10 In Barrington-Herron’s model, however, these three 
eastern regions are included in two different political units: Donetsk and Luhansk make up 
“east” bordering Russia and being most Russified regions (both demographically and 
linguistically) and more so than “east-central” (Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia) that 
have less Russian population. “Eight-region” model also manages to separate Crimea with 
Sevastopol into separate political unit taking into consideration demography (Russian 
population is majority) and historical developments such as it was the last territory to become 
part of Ukraine and also did not support Ukrainian independence during 1991 referendum. 
Western Ukraine is divided into three distinct political units: “west” in traditional sense also 
known as Galicia that belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland and is composed 
of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, “west-central” that includes Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, 
Khmelnetskiy, Rivne, Volyn provinces that became part of Russian empire in late XVIII as 
a result of partition of Poland, and “southwest” of Chernivtsi and Zakarpatia that Barrington 
and Herron named hidden “outlier” in Ukrainian regional division as the geography (borders 
with Romania, Moldova, Hungary and Slovakia) and history made their political attitudes to 
be less Ukrainian than the rest of western Ukraine. Two remaining regions provide basis for 
another sort of divide, in this case it would be “north-south”: “north” is made of Poltava, 
Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy oblasts together with city of Kyiv and “south” 
represented by Kherson, Odesa and Mikolaiv provinces that were under Ottoman control and 
became part of Russia only in late XVIII c.11  
It has been consistently suggested that Ukrainian “identity split” presents an obstacle to 
successful democratic transition in the post-Soviet period. Ukrainian conflict between 
identities implies not only competition between cultural values and interpretations of history 
but also between political preferences, values and choices that represent democratic and non-
                                                 
10 Igor Rotar, “Is Kharkiv Province Another Enclave of Separatists?,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 12, no. 44, 
March 10, 2015, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43641&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=27&cHash=6bab3dd55ee5616007d06eb08789b04c#.ViJyAOGhdla 
11 Suggested by Barrington and Faranda in Lowell Barrington and Regina Faranda, “Reexamining Region, 
Ethnicity, and Language in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet Affairs 25, no. 3 (2009): 232-256. 
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democratic regimes. Several case studies and survey results have demonstrated that Ukraine 
is one of few cases in the post-Soviet space where patterns of national identification do have 
considerable influence on attitude towards democracy and authoritarianism and, for example, 
Rusanna Gaber’s research on national identity and democratic consolidation in Central and 
Eastern Europe demonstrated a considerable gap between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian 
population with former expressing much more skepticism towards idea of authentic 
Ukrainian national identity and democratic development.12 Taras Kuzio has been quite 
committed in his argument that pro-Russian loyalties and Soviet nostalgia that have ensured 
support of highly corrupted Party of Regions during  parliamentary and presidential elections 
in Ukraine are much more dangerous to Ukraine’s democratic future than marginalized 
organizations of far-right nationalists such as “Svoboda” political party that did not get any 
seats during last parliamentary elections in October 2014.13 Russian-Ukrainian crisis seemed 
to prove validity of Kuzio’s concerns about pro-Russian and neo-Soviet nationalism in 
eastern Ukraine that supported Russian intervention. Lucan A. Way also argued in his work 
comparing cases of Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Belarus that identity split in Ukraine 
prevents consolidation of any type of regime due to the possibilities of mass mobilization on 
both sides.14 It is essentially uncontested and demonstrated by numerous surveys that 
democratic values receive lower support in eastern Ukrainian regions and Crimea where 
people tend to prefer “stability” over democracy. There has not been yet studies regarding 
how Russian-Ukrainian conflict has affected democracy in Ukraine and its linkage to national 
                                                 
12 See Rusanna Gaber, “National Identity and Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe,” 
International Journal of Sociology 36, no. 3 (2006): 35-69. The main criteria that distinguishes Russian and 
Ukrainian groups in Gaber’s study, however, is their linguistic affiliation which Taras Kuzio and other 
scholars warn against using it as predictor of political preferences. The suggestion about consistently lower 
support for democracy in eastern Ukraine is also made by Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, “The 
Key to Kiev: Ukraine’s security means Europe’s stability,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (2009): 106-120; 
Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and post-communist transition,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, 2012, 439-446; Kuzio, “A New Framework for Understanding 
Nationalisms in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, Separatism and Russian Hybrid War”. 
13 Kuzio, “A New Framework for Understanding Nationalisms in Ukraine: Democratic Revolutions, 
Separatism and Russian Hybrid War”. 
14 Lucan A. Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth 
Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 231-61. 
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identity, although, there have been opinions expressed that Russian hostility and aggressive 
politics would strengthen Ukrainian national identity and contribute to overcoming of its 
internal divisions.15    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Mykola Riabchuk, “‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence,” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 15, no. 1 (2015): 138-56. 
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Chapter 3. Russia and Democratisation in Post-Soviet Ukraine. 
  3.1. 2004: Presidential Elections and Orange Revolution. 
It can be said that by 2016 Russia has had two major involvements in Ukrainian 
domestic politics during 2004 presidential elections and initiation of Russian-Ukrainian crisis 
starting from Euromaidan in 2013.  
Ukraine seemed to enter 2000s with firm intentions of improving its previously poor 
economic situation introducing liberal reforms and fight against corruption mostly due to 
efforts of Prime-Minister Victor Yushchenko (1999-2001). Despite initiating reformist turn 
in Ukrainian politics, Yushchenko did not last long in environment dominated by oligarchs 
and corruption and in 2001 was removed from then Leonid Kuchma’s government. 
Following his retirement, Yushchenko continued his career in opposition, although he was 
hardly a revolutionary type compared to, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko. When infamous 
“Kuchmagate” started, Yushchenko and his political party Our Ukraine were the only ones 
from opposition who did not demand immediate Kuchma’s resignation.16 “Kuchmagate” is 
a reference to public release of audio tapes in 2001 by leader of Socialist Party of Ukraine 
(SPU) Oleksandr Moroz that proved Leonid Kuchma’s role in unsolved murder of opposition 
journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000.17 The tapes’ release was followed by mass protests 
that called for resignation of Kuchma headed by opposition leaders Tymoshenko and Yuri 
Lutsenko from SPU. In many ways “Kuchmagate” was one of main reasons why Victor 
Yanukovych and not Kuchma became the candidate in presidential elections 2004. 2004 
presidential campaign divided Ukrainian voters as Yanukovych gained official support from 
                                                 
16 Taras Kuzio, “Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: ‘Kuchmagate’ to the Orange Revolution,” in Democratic 
Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution, ed. Taras Kuzio (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009), 31-58.   
17 For more details on Kuchmagate see Kuzio, “Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: ‘Kuchmagate’ to the Orange 
Revolution”. 
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Russia and aimed at Russian-speaking population, while Yushchenko’s main target was 
centre and western Ukraine.18 
During 2004 presidential elections Russia took unexpectedly active role in supporting pro-
Russian presidential candidate (who also represented Donetsk clan in Ukrainian politics) 
Viktor Yanukovych. Much of Russia’s political technologies that were employed later in 
domestic politics to suppress and discredit pro-democratic protests in 2011-12 had originated 
during 2004 electoral campaign in Ukraine. Notable political actors from Russian side 
included Gleb Pavlovsky head of Russian Fund for Effective Politics (FEP) who formulated 
media strategy in order to increase popularity of Yanukovych and destroy his pro-Western 
competitor Yushchenko.19 There was a huge anti-Yushchenko campaign aimed to alienate 
his supporters. One of the most popular arguments was alleged Russophobia of Yushchenko 
and rumors that if he won there would be nation-wide discrimination of Russian population 
in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.20 The irony was that it was actually President of Ukraine 
Leonid Kuchma’s head of administration Viktor Medvedchuk who had control over major 
nationalist groups Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly (UNA), the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists in Ukraine (ONUvU), Rukh and Bratstvo (Brotherhood).21 Other moves 
included staged terrorist attacks of alleged Yushchenko’s supporters at Yanukovych with 
participation of Russian Security Services. Russian side of presidential campaign also 
introduced variety of conspiracy theories and alleged linkages of Yushchenko to the US when 
the former was presented as a puppet of the US State Department. US conspiracy theories 
were quite convenient at the time as not only they discredited Yushchenko but also managed 
                                                 
18 Taras Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange 
Revolution,” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 2 (2005): 29-44. 
19 See Marta Dyczok, “Breaking Through the Information Blockade: Election and Revolution in Ukraine 
2004,” in Aspects of the Orange Revolution II: Information and Manipulation Strategies in the 2004 
Ukrainian Presidential Elections, eds. Bohdan Harasymiw and Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 
2014), 86. 
20 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, and Valentin Yakushik, Aspects of the Orange Revolution V: 
Institutional Observation Reports on the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 
2014), 160. 
21 Taras Kuzio, “Russian Policy Towards Ukraine During Elections,” Democratizatsiya 13, no. 4 (2005): 491-
517. 
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to explain “Kuchmagate” as part of the US plan to replace pro-Russian Yanukovych with 
pro-Western Yushchenko.22  
However, despite all efforts by Russia, Ukrainian presidential elections 2004 turned out to 
be a surprise for all sides. No candidate gained majority during the first electoral round in 
October so there was a second round in November that was rumored to have mass 
falsification in support of Yanukovych. Unsurprisingly, Yanukovych won second round and 
Kyiv responded to his victory by mass protests with demands for fair elections. It should be 
said that in 2004 Ukraine’s state institutions sided with people. First, Ukrainian parliament 
(Verkhovnaja Rada) had announced it would not acknowledge final results and, afterwards, 
Ukrainian Supreme Court had introduced additional round of elections in December that 
resulted in Yushchenko’s victory that was worldwide interpreted as the first triumph of 
grassroot democracy in post-communist space. Unfortunately, it was short-term victory as 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko who became Prime-Minister in new government failed to 
cooperate and produce coherent results in solving most outstanding issues such as corruption. 
The political crisis of Orange Coalition resulted in return of Yanukovych who had been in 
power until 2013 Euromaidan. 
Russia was perhaps the one political actor who was most surprised and later alarmed by 
results of 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and in the end decided to interpret it as West’s 
efforts at circling Russia with pro-Western regimes. Russia’s elites did not comprehend at 
the time that failure of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine was rooted in lack of understanding 
that Ukraine was in fact not Russia.23 Orange Revolution was not an entirely unexpected 
phenomenon as it was result of long-lasting developments in Ukrainian politics including its 
elites, robust civil society and youth organizations.24  
                                                 
22 Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian Politicians Put the Squeeze on Civil Society,” Radio Free Europe, May 18, 2011, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/ukrainian_politicians_puts_the_squeeze_on_civil_society/24178777.html 
23 See Yitzhak M. Brudny and Evgeny Finkel, “Why Ukraine Is Not Russia: Hegemonic National Identity and 
Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” East European Politics and Societies 25, 2011, 813-33. 
24 For more background, see Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (London: Yale University Press, 
2005), 25-51; Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2007).  
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3.2. Russian-Ukrainian Crisis 2014. 
By 2013, Russia was completely certain that color revolutions in Eurasia were 
foreign-made and staged by Western powers in order to bring pro-Western regimes to power. 
The Revolution of Dignity or Euromaidan protests in the end of 2013 became a source of 
great headache to Russian elites that had already negotiated with Yanukovych that Ukraine 
is going to drop out of negotiations about signing EU Association Agreement and instead 
consider joining Russian initiative in Eurasia the Customs Union that in 2016 included 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Again as in 2004 Russia repeated 
same mistake of negotiating directly with political elites ignoring the attitude of Ukrainian 
people. It is a typical top-down perspective on politics that can be justified in centralized 
authoritarian states such as Russia but it has repeatedly failed to work in much more 
pluralistic society of Ukraine with multiple groups of interests. So when Yanukovych and 
Prime-Minister Nikolai Azarov announced there will be no signing of Association 
Agreement, Kyiv responded same as it did in 2004 only on much bigger scale especially after 
there were reports of police forces persecuting protesting students. By 2013 Yanukovych’s 
regime had already been unpopular with multiple evidences of all-pervasive corruption so it 
did not take much for people to demand for Yanukovych to leave. Yanukovych tried to 
negotiate with protest leaders to bargain out staying in power until next elections but in the 
end he had to fled Kyiv in February 2014 and with assistance of Russian Security Services 
(as Putin smugly acknowledged in interview a year later) was transferred to Russia.25   
While Ukraine was trying to recover from the change of regime and re-configure 
governmental apparatus, Russian soldiers took Crimea’s local legislature in February 2014.26 
In March 2014 Crimea held referendum about joining the Russian Federation that got 
                                                 
25 "Crym: Put' na Rodinu," Rossiya 1 TV Channel, March 15, 2015, 
http://russia.tv/video/show/brand_id/59195/episode_id/1180834. 
26 Simon Shuster, “Putin’s Man in Crimea Is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare,” Time, March 10, 2014, 
http://time.com/19097/putin-crimea-russia-ukraine-aksyonov/. 
14 
 
 
 
approval of 96.7%.27 Results of Crimean referendum have been much discussed and 
consensus that emerged has acknowledged that majority of Crimeans had probably genuinely 
desired joining Russia, however, astonishing figure of 96.7% still owed a lot to Russian 
soldiers or “green men” that were stationed in Crimea during referendum.28 While 
international community was still shocked by Russia’s move and figuring out the 
proportional response to obvious violation of international law, Russia made another move 
into eastern Ukraine resulting in emergence of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in 
May 20114.29 By 2016 there has been an overwhelming amount of evidence that “people’s 
republics” in Donbass would not survive that long without financial and military support of 
Russia that officially declared it did not have any stakes in Donbass conflict besides 
protection of Russian-speaking population. In July 2014 MH17 Malaysia Airlines 
commercial flight was shot over Donetsk region. In 2016 there still has been no official 
conclusion about who should be held responsible for this tragedy and death of 398 people 
but the popular consensus amongst experts has been that the shot was fired by Russian 
separatists who had come into possession of Russian missile “Buk” and due to incompetence 
confused MH17 commercial flight with Ukrainian military plane.30 MH17 tragedy and 
humanitarian crisis in eastern Ukraine led to intervention by the EU, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Germany and France and negotiations on 
ceasefire. By 2016 there have been two ceasefire agreements (known as Minsk I and Minsk 
II) in September 2014 and February 2015 respectively with first having been violated almost 
                                                 
27 Ilya Somin, “Russian government agency reveals fraudulent nature of the Crimean referendum results,” The 
Washington Post, May 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/05/06/russian-government-agency-reveals-fraudulent-nature-of-the-crimean-referendum-
results/. 
28 "Crym: Put' na Rodinu," Rossiya 1 TV Channel, March 15, 2015, 
http://russia.tv/video/show/brand_id/59195/episode_id/1180834. 
29 “DNR provozglasila sebja suverennym gosudarstvom,” RIA Novosti, May 11, 2014, 
http://ria.ru/world/20140512/1007507367.html. 
30 Pavel Fel’gengauer, “Malayziskiy Boeing – oshibka, kotoruju nikto ne priznaet,” Novaja Gazeta, July 21, 
2014, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/columns/64483.html; “MH17 crash: Ukraine releases alleged intercepts,” 
BBC News, July 18, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28362872. 
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immediately and second still being in power in 2016 when the situation in eastern Ukraine 
remains highly uncertain.31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 See “Ukraine crisis: Fighting in Donetsk despite ceasefire,” BBC News, September 14, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29195880; “Details of the Ukraine Cease-Fire Negotiated in Minsk,” 
The New York Times, February 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/europe/ukraine-cease-
fire-negotiated-in-minsk.html. 
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Chapter 4. Theory. 
4.1. Democratisation and Nation-Building in Post-Communism. 
Theoretical framework for the first research question comes from the theory of 
democratic transition in post-communist context where nation-building and national 
identification were considered important factors. As noticed by Dankwart A. Rustow, there 
are quite different directions of research in democratisation that distinguish between generic 
(what gives birth to democracy) and function (what makes democracies succeed) theories of 
democracy.32 In general democratisation theories are categorized as either structuralist or 
agency-oriented approaches that see emergence of democratic society dependent on pre-
existing conditions or conscious actions of political and social actors respectively.33 
Structuralist theories of democracy include well-known Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
modernization theory about existing causal links between socioeconomic development and 
democratisation where democracy is perceived as a product of modernization forces and 
social changes they bring such as industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of income, 
literacy, and rise of middle class.34 There has been quite a lot of skepticism about direct 
causality between socioeconomic determinants and democracy that has criticized Lipset’s 
thesis for being overdeterministic and ignoring role of political actors and their agency.35 One 
of the most known challenges of modernization theory came from work of Adam Przeworski 
and his colleagues who argued that socioeconomic conditions were not decisive to the 
emergence of democracy, although, higher levels of economic development were crucial for 
                                                 
32 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 
3 (1970): 337-63.  
33 More detailed overview of democratisation theories and recent trends can be found in Jean Grugel and 
Matthew Louis Bishop, Democratisation: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 
Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto, Democratic Transition: Modes and Outcomes (London: Routledge, 
2014); Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Democracy and Democratisation in Comparative 
Perspective: Conceptions, Conjunctures, Causes, and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
34 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 
35 Grugel and Bishop, Democratisation: A Critical Introduction, 77-78. 
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democracies to endure.36 Another major branch of structuralist approach to democratisation 
includes historical sociology and role of social forces proposed by Barrington Moore who 
was the one to introduce the famous thesis “no bourgeoisie – no democracy”37. Over time, 
Moore’s structuralist social forces approach also has taken more marginalized position as 
academic debates within the field shifted to post-structuralist direction and grew more aware 
of the role of agency and skeptical about neo-Marxist approach to analysis of political 
transformations.38  
The other major direction in the field of democratisation known as democratic transition 
approach or transitology considers democratisation as three-stage process (opening, 
breakthrough, consolidation) that is broader than existing structural conditions and which 
depends on intentions and conscious actions of political actors.39 Within this school the 
process of democratic transition is considered as movement “aimed at establishing a 
democratic political system, initiated either from above (elite driven) or below (mass driven) 
or a combination of both”40 that focuses on interaction processes and bargaining between 
political actors that ultimately can lead to the initiation of democratic reforms. Although 
democratic transition is a process that in theory can be initiated from either top or bottom, 
elite-driven democratisation and role of political elites takes up a major part of transitology 
research supported by empirical evidence about key role of elites in triggering authoritarian 
regime transformations whereas strong civil society and wide-spread support of 
democratisation is considered important for the democracy consolidation and its survival in 
                                                 
36 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 137. 
37 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 418. 
38 Grugel and Bishop, Democratisation: A Critical Introduction, 84-85. 
39 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21. 
40 Guo and Stradiotto, Democratic Transition: Modes and Outcomes, 19. 
18 
 
 
 
long-term.41 Democratic transition gained its popularity in 1980s with the “third wave” of 
democracy that included Latin America and South Europe and the “fourth wave” of ex-
communist countries but has been questioned for its utility with the apparent failure of 
suggested course of democratic transition in majority of ex-Soviet countries and appearance 
of multiple types of hybrid regimes that have been neither pure democratic nor authoritarian 
ones.42 This study is done following Rustow’s model that described democratic transition as 
ongoing three-phases process that can take decades before (if ever) it becomes consolidated. 
Rustow’s model includes preparatory, decision, and habituation phases where the last one 
roughly coincides with democratic consolidation described by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
as democracy becoming “the only game in town”43. 
Rustow’s model of democratic transition is specifically interesting for this research because 
he was the one to suggest in early 1970s that not economic or other structural determinants 
but “national unity” or “need for consensus” was one crucial condition for successful 
democratic transition that would prevent separatism and civil wars. Rustow’s attention to the 
national unity in many ways foresaw the problems that democratic transition would 
experience in post-communist states with what Linz and Stepan described as “stateness”44 
problem i.e. unresolved differences about established territorial boundaries and who should 
be included in political community of citizens. Later processes of transition in 1990s would 
attract even more attention to the fact that previous “third wave” of democratisation involved 
states that almost all had been nations with stable national identities prior to their transitions, 
thus escaping the problem that post-communist states had to face undergoing not only 
                                                 
41 For role of elites in downfall of authoritarian regimes see Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, “How 
Autocracies Fall,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2014): 35-47; Natasha Erzow and Erica Frantz, 
Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders (New York: The 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2014), 82-86; Grugel and Bishop, Democratisation: A Critical 
Introduction, 89. 
42 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”. 
43 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6. 
44 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe, 16. 
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processes of political transformation and economic reforms but also nation-building.45 The 
problem of “triple transition” in post-communist states and incomplete democratic transition 
in such divided states as Ukraine has contributed to the suggestions that it would be difficult 
to move from transition to consolidation without “prior consensus on overarching national 
identity and boundaries”46. Following this logic, there has been a considerable number of 
works that has stressed importance of national consensus and unity in democratic 
consolidation. Given the wide range of definitions of nationalism and nations and often 
exclusive nature of many types of nationalism, most scholars try to avoid using term 
“nationalism” and “national identity” in their works. Rustow goes with using Deutsch’s 
concept of national unity that does not actually imply “shared attitudes and beliefs”47 but 
rather the efficiency of communication on national level and ability to reach consensus during 
the process of deliberation.48 Some scholars prefer to use the term of “community” 49 as, for 
example, Eric Martinez-Herrera when talking about identification with David Easton’s 
“political community”50 that includes all individuals that are ruled and represented by the 
structures of a political system or Dieler Fuchs that replaces “national identity” with sense of 
community.51 In general, the hypothesized benevolent relationship between national 
identification and democracy can be described by Martinez-Herrera’s “virtuous circle”52 that 
suggests there can exist “non-recursive” relationship between identification with political 
                                                 
45 With exception for Spain. For more details, see Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “The 
Conceptual Travel of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to 
Go?,” Slavic Review 53, 1994: 173-85.   
46 Ibid., 178. 
47 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 350-52. 
48 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism 
(London: The MIT Press, 1966), 188. 
49 Eric Martinez-Herrera, “Competing National Identities and Democratisation: A Theoretical and 
Comparative Analysis,” in Nationalism and Democracy: Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions, eds. 
Andre Lecours and Luis Moreno (New York: Routledge, 2010), 80-100.  
50 David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965). 
51 Dieler Fuchs, “The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany,” in Critical Citizens. Global Support for 
Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 124.  
52 Martinez-Herrera, “Competing National Identities and Democratisation: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis,” 91-93. 
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community and support for democracy that is reinforced by “common good perception” and 
“political community pride”. The study of Ukraine during Russian-Ukrainian crisis can be a 
worthy contribution to the studies of how national identification and consensus can interact 
with democratic consolidation given the identity split of Ukraine and its incomplete 
democratic transition that could have been considered given a new start in 2004 following 
the Orange Revolution but never reaching the stage of democratic consolidation/habituation 
and experiencing degradation in 2010-13 period following return of Yanukovych to the 
power.  
4.2. Defining and Measuring Democratic Consolidation.  
The second research question looks at theories of democratic consolidation and how 
to identify it in recently democratized countries. Democratic consolidation much as 
democracy itself is an ambiguous concept with multiple definitions related to various 
dimensions of political life such as wide-spread diffusion of democratic values, 
decentralization, emergence of strong political party system, and dominance of pro-
democratic actors in political life.53 It can be said though that during democratic 
consolidation phase “many uncertainties of the transition period are progressively 
diminished” as “new regime becomes institutionalized, framework of open and competitive 
political expression becomes internalized, and preceding uncertainties and insecurities are 
overcome”54. Generally speaking, democratic consolidation is “expected persistence of 
liberal democracy”55. However, proper understanding of democratic consolidation also 
depends on the type of political regime such as autocracy, electoral democracy, liberal 
democracy, and advanced democracy.56 Depending on the type of political regime 
democratic consolidation can take on different meanings. In case of autocracy and electoral 
                                                 
53 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?,” Journal of Democracy 9, 1998. 
54 Lawrence Whitehead, “The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies,” European Consortium for Political 
Research, 1988, 6. 
55 Carsten Q. Schneider, The Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 10. 
56 Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?”. 
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democracy it has negative meaning as it signifies prevention of democratic rollback and 
deterioration close to original meaning of the concept when it emerged in 1980s.57 In more 
advanced democracies democratic consolidation takes on more positive meaning of 
deepening existing democratic regimes. Democratic consolidation is a long-term process and 
in general scholars agree that it takes about 10-15 years from the beginning of democratic 
transition before democratisation reached its final phase.  
As there are multiple understandings of democratic consolidation it can be difficult to figure 
out how to identify and measure it in practice. There are various opinions on how democratic 
consolidation can be measured. Linz and Stepan introduce three components of democratic 
consolidation (i) behavioral (“when no significant actor attempts to achieve their objectives 
by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede 
from the state”), (ii) attitudinal (“strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that 
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern”), (iii) 
constitutional (“governmental and nongovernmental actors become subjected to resolution 
of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by new 
democratic process”).58 Schneider introduces twelve indicators of democratic consolidation 
that should be taken into account whenever assessments of consolidation are done.59 These 
are: 
 No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution. 
 Regular elections are held and their outcomes are respected by those in position 
of public authority and major opposition parties. 
 The elections have been free and fair. 
 No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions. 
 Electoral volatility has diminished significantly. 
 Elected officials and representatives are not constrained in their behavior by non-
elected veto groups within the country. 
 A first rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred within the scope of the rules already established. 
                                                 
57 Schneider, The Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America, 11. 
58 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe, 6-7. 
59 Schneider, The Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America, 18. 
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 A second rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has 
occurred within the scope of the rules already established. 
Agreement, formal and informal, has been reached on the rules governing the: 
 Formation of associations and their behavior. 
 Executive format. 
 Territorial division of competence. 
 Rules of ownership and access to mass media. 
Although there is no uniform opinion on what indicators are the best in assessment of 
democratic consolidation, there are two main dimension that gain most attention from 
scholars – party system and wide acceptance of democratic rules (or constitutional and 
attitudinal elements of democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan). As it was 
noted by Geoffrey Pridham, “focusing on political parties and party systems must remain a 
basic if not the central theme for examining not only the quality of liberal democracy in 
question but also its progress towards an achievement of democratic consolidation”60. 
Political parties are considered to be key actors in democratic consolidation as they are key 
agents in “institutionalization of new regime”61, ensure links between government and 
society and act as channels for participation. A strong party system is necessary for 
consolidation of democratic regime along with independent political parties, internal 
democracy and rooting of political parties in society. Another popular suggestion for 
measuring democratic consolidation follows from its definition as mass acceptance of 
democratic rules, support of democratic institutions and satisfaction with their performance 
as primary indicator.62 While public acceptance is recognized as not a sufficient condition of 
democratic consolidation it still remains an important indicator.63 
 
                                                 
60 Geoffrey Pridham, “Southern Europe democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment 
of the role of political parties,” in Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in 
Southern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (New York: Routledge, 2016), 2. 
61 Ibid., 15. 
62 Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”.   
63 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, “Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic 
Regimes,” in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, eds. John Higley 
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Chapter 5. Methodology and Limitations. 
The first research question suggests that Russian-Ukrainian conflict and resurgence 
of Russian neo-imperialism have had consolidating impact on Ukrainian pro-Western/pro-
Russian identity split by creating support for integration with the European Union amongst 
previously pro-Russian regions. The second research question is concerned with whether 
Euromaidan and more pro-European national identification could have had positive effects 
on democratic consolidation in Ukraine by strengthening its attitudinal (support for 
democracy) and constitutional (party system) components theorized by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan.64  
Methodology for the first research question about changes in divided Ukrainian national 
identity since the beginning of Russian-Ukrainian conflict includes statistical analysis that 
estimates variations in Ukrainian public attitude alongside three indicators. The first indicator 
is whether Russian-Ukrainian crisis has resulted in stronger support of the integration with 
the European Union (EU) and less support for integration with the Customs Union/Eurasian 
Economic Union (CU) on the regional level. The attitude towards integration into 
supranational unions in Ukraine during 2014-15 has been assessed using data from 
International Republican Institute (IRI) that consistently made public opinion surveys in 
Ukraine in March, April and September 2014 and July and September 2015.65 These surveys 
                                                 
64 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe, 6-7. 
65 “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine. March 14-26, 2014,” International Republican Institute, 
March 2014, 
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were done in form of interviews and included around 1200 respondents across Ukraine 
excluding Crimea since April 2014 and Donetsk and Luhansk regions in July and September 
2015. The question pertinent to integration was asked in all five surveys and was phrased as 
“If Ukraine was able to enter only one international economic union, which of the following 
should it be?”. The same question was also asked on regional level in March and April 2014 
and July 2015. IRI used standard framework of “four-region” Ukraine that included “West” 
(Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnitsky, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Transcarpathia, Volyn), 
“Center” (Cherkassy, Chernihiv, Kirovograd, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, 
Kyiv city), “South” (Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia), and “East” (Dnipropetrovsk, 
Kharkiv).  
The second indicator is whether there have been significant changes in how Ukrainian view 
Russia and the EU. IRI’s public opinion surveys allow to evaluate how the attitude towards 
Russia and the EU has changed on the national level. Four public opinion surveys conducted 
in March and April 2014 and July and September 2015 contained a query about how 
respondents would evaluate their attitude toward other countries estimating their feelings as 
“warm”, “neutral”, “cold” and “difficult to answer”66.   
Finally, the third indicator is whether there have been changes in voting patterns for pro-
Western and pro-Russian candidates on regional level during presidential elections 2014 and 
support for pro-Western and pro-Russian political parties during parliamentary elections of 
2014 and local elections of 2015. The data about elections was taken directly from Central 
Elections Committee of Ukraine. Candidates for presidential elections and political parties 
have been characterized as pro-Western/pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian based on the position 
they have taken in regards to the integration with the EU or the CU and dominating narratives 
during their electoral campaigns that identify Ukrainian future either as part of European 
community or Russian world. The analysis has been concerned with how voting preferences 
for pro-Western and pro-Russian candidates changed in 2014 in regards to previously 
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existing regional division that can be demonstrated by analyzing data of 2004 and 2010 
presidential elections. The regional model used during analysis of elections was “eight-
region” Ukraine suggested by Barrington and Herron which was better at describing eight 
distinct sets of cohesive attitudes and behavior coming from different history, economy and 
demographic indicators that are often blurred and overlooked in “two-” and “four-region” 
models.67 “Eight-region” model divides Ukraine into West (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, 
Ternopil), West-central (Vinnytsia, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Khmelnitsky, Volyn), Southwest 
(Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia), North (Cherkassy, Chernihiv, Kyiv city, Kyiv region, 
Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy), East (Donetsk, Luhansk), East-central (Dnipropetrovsk, 
Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv), South (Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa) and Crimea. For reasons related 
to Russian annexation in Crimea and military conflict in Donbass region, presidential and 
parliamentary elections 2014 took place only in seven regions (excluding Crimea), while 
local elections 2015 represented only six regions excluding both Crimea and East (Donetsk 
and Luhansk). 
The second research question is concerned with state of democratic consolidation in Ukraine 
using Linz and Stepan’s three-component model. It is quite self-evident that Russian-
Ukrainian crisis has exerted negative influence in terms of behavioral component of 
democratic consolidation that presupposes absence of groups that want to secede or challenge 
existing political regime with opposite situation in Ukraine in early 2016 when secessionist 
regimes still occupy Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It is, however, less clear how crisis have 
affected attitudinal and constitutional elements. The data for attitudinal dimension or 
democratic preferences on regional level was taken from Ukrainian municipal polls in 2015 
and 2016 conducted by IRI.68 In terms of political parties or constitutional dimension that 
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emphasizes behavior of political actors, the selected method was literature review that 
described post-crisis party system in Ukraine.  
There are some important limitations to this research. In terms of researching state of 
democratic consolidation in Ukraine, there is a time factor that does not allow to fully 
consider how well or badly the process is going. Most scholars agree that in order to properly 
assess democratic transition and consolidation no less than ten years are needed. Therefore, 
research’s finding should be interpreted as commentary on ongoing democratic consolidation 
process rather than a final verdict about its success or failure.  
In terms of democratisation theory, research mostly focuses on domestic factors such as 
national identification and political actors and ignores external determinants of 
democratisation. There is an extensive literature about role of external factors in post-
communist democratisation in Eastern Europe. Prior to the collapse of communism, the 
consensus was that external factors could create a “favorable environment”69 but still 
domestic politics mattered more. However, further studies revealed that “international factors 
have had a more persistent and profound effect”70 in post-communist transition than in any 
other democratic transition wave. Extensive analysis of role of NGOs, international 
organizations and Western states allowed renowned scholar in post-communist studies and 
democracy Jan Zielonka to conclude that “democracy in Eastern Europe is to a significant 
extent foreign made”71. The EU is often considered as the second most influential actor in 
democracy promotion due to its soft power that was laid in the foundation of European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and later Eastern Partnership (EaP) policies designed to promote 
democracy and rule of law in ex-communist neighborhood. Following Ukrainian crisis there 
have been criticisms of ENP and EaP that mainly focused on weak motivation of these 
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programs for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and South Caucasus as they do not offer possibility 
of future membership. Nevertheless, as it has been shown by events of Ukrainian Euromaidan 
in 2013 European way still represents a lot of appeal for post-communist societies especially 
in comparison with conservative and increasingly chauvinistic Russia. There are many 
studies of EU’s instruments involved in democracy promotion that can be briefly described 
as incentive-based (conditionality) and persuasion strategies.72 
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Chapter 6. Ukrainian Crisis and National Identification in Ukraine. 
The first research question refers to effects Russian-Ukrainian crisis had on identity 
split in Ukraine and whether there has been more consolidation and less division in national 
identification especially in the regions that traditionally voted in support of pro-Russian 
candidates and political parties. There are three indicators that are used to determine current 
state of Ukrainian identity split. The first one is support for integration with international 
unions such as the European Union (EU) and the Customs Union (CU) demonstrating 
whether Russian-Ukrainian crisis has resulted in stronger support of the integration with the 
EU and less support for integration with the CU on national and regional level. The second 
indicator is how Ukrainians perceive Russia and the EU after the start of the conflict. The 
third indicator is whether there have been changes in usual regional distribution of pro-
Western/pro-Russian votes during presidential elections of 2014 and regional support of pro-
Western/pro-Russian political parties during parliamentary elections in 2014 and local 
election in 2015. 
6.1. Russia and the EU: Where Ukraine Should Belong. 
 The results of IRI’s public survey on national level (Fig. 1) demonstrates there has 
been a considerable change in Ukrainian attitude starting from the beginning of Russian-
Ukrainian crisis in March 2014 as support for integration with the EU started to rapidly grow 
simultaneously with decreasing support for membership in the CU.  
On the regional level, the picture is more complicated. In March 2014 (Fig. 2) idea of 
integration with the EU enjoyed support in western and central Ukraine, however, eastern 
and southern Ukraine still clearly preferred integration with Russia and the CU. In April 2014 
(Fig. 3) the situation stayed the same, although support for the CU in southern regions started 
to decline. A year later in July 2015 (Fig. 4) public opinion’s survey demonstrated that 
western, central and southern Ukraine gave preference for integration with the EU and, 
although majority respondents in eastern Ukraine still indicated the CU as their first choice, 
their support of the CU declined to almost half of what it was back in 2014.   
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Figure 1. Support for integration processes on the national level, 2014-2015. 
 
        Figure 2. Support for integration processes, regional level, March 2014 
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       Figure 3. Support for integration processes, regional level, April 2014 
 
         Figure 4. Support for integration processes, regional level, July 2015 
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In March 2014 (Fig. 5) around half of Ukrainian participants in IRI’s public survey (45%) 
described their feelings towards Russia as “cold” and only 31% still felt “warm” about their 
neighbour. The situation got worse in April 2014 (Fig. 6) that coincided with the beginning 
of military actions in eastern Ukraine as around 66% of Ukrainians were feeling “cold” 
towards Russia with only 15% still describing their attitude as “warm”. The disapproval 
figures for Russia remained stable a year later when surveys’ results demonstrated that in 
July (Fig. 7) and September 2015 (Fig. 8) still around 60% of respondents were feeling “cold” 
about Russia.  
The EU has enjoyed stable support getting “warm” responses from around 50% of 
respondents during 2014 and 2015. It should be noted that, although, support for the EU has 
not increased significantly from the beginning of the crisis, negative attitude and “cold” 
feelings towards the EU have dropped almost by half since April 2014 and remained at low 
point of 10%. 
To summarize, results from 2014-15 surveys on both integration and foreign policy 
orientation in Ukraine allow to suggest that: a). Ukrainian regional division about integration 
with the EU or the CU that existed prior to 2014 lost much of its actuality by 2015 as three 
(western, southern and center) out of four regions in Ukraine have supported idea of 
European integration, while popularity of the CU in eastern Ukraine has fallen by 50%; b). 
Russia’s appeal as external actor and regional superpower in Ukraine has experienced a 
strong fall as only around 15% of Ukrainian still see Russian as benevolent power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
                Figure 5. Attitude towards Russia and EU, March 2014 
 
                Figure 6. Attitude towards Russia and EU, April 2014 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Russia European Union
March 2014
Warm Neutral Cold Don't know/Difficult to answer
33 
 
 
 
                   Figure 7. Attitude towards Russia and EU, July 2015 
 
              Figure 8. Attitude towards Russia and EU, September 2015 
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6.2. Pro-Western vs. Pro-Russian Presidential Candidates in 2014 Presidential 
Elections. 
2004 presidential elections were a turning point for Ukrainian society as struggle for 
fair elections brought first Ukrainian Maidan or ‘Orange’ Revolution to the start. 2004 
presidential elections were an opposition between pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych 
and pro-Western one Viktor Yushchenko. The first round of 2004 presidential elections on 
October 31 was inconclusive as no candidate gained majority so elections went to the second 
round in November that ended with Central Elections Committee announcing Yanukovych 
as the winner. Yanukovych’s victory triggered mass protests in Kiev that accused 
Yanukovych in electoral fraud. Verkhovnaja Rada (Ukraine’s legislature) refused to 
acknowledge results of elections and the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled out that results 
were falsified so there was another round of elections on December 26 that brought up 
another winner Victor Yushchenko. 2004 presidential elections demonstrated existing 
regional divide as western, central and northern Ukraine voted for pro-Western/pro-
Ukrainian candidate, while eastern and southern Ukraine and Crimea clearly preferred pro-
Russian candidate (Fig. 9).73 
2010 presidential elections also could have been described as stand-off between pro-Russian 
candidate Viktor Yanukovych and pro-Western/pro-Ukrainian candidate Yulia Timoshenko 
that resulted in victory of Yanukovych in second round.74 The regional division between 
regions represented approximately the same picture as it was in 2004 (Fig. 10). 
2014 presidential elections were held amidst Russian-Ukrainian crisis, therefore, strongly 
influenced by tensions between Russia and Ukraine, Crimea’s annexations and presence of 
Russian military in eastern Ukraine.75 2014 elections excluded Crimea and only around 20% 
of population in Donbass region were able to participate due to the threat of violence from 
                                                 
73 All data on elections is taken from Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, Presidential Elections 2004, 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/ 
74 Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, Presidential Elections 2010, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp_2010/ 
75 Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, Presidential Elections 2014, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp_2014/ 
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separatist forces. Majority of candidates used pro-Western/pro-Ukrainian discourse in their 
campaigns with only exception of Mykhailo Dobkin from Party of Regions and Petro 
Simonenko from the Communist Party of Ukraine (he actually withdrew from elections but 
did it after deadline of May 1, 2014 so his name was still in ballots on election day May 25, 
2014). Unlike other candidates, Simonenko and Dobkin promised revival of partnership with 
Russia, membership in the CU and posed against integration with the EU which allowed to 
define them as pro-Russian candidates in 2014 presidential elections.76 Other candidates that 
gained over 1% in 2014 elections included Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Timoshenko, Oleh 
Lyashko, Anatoly Hrytsenko, Serhiy Tihipko, Vadim Rabinovych, Olga Bogomolets, and 
Oleh Tyahnybok all are defined as pro-Western/pro-Ukrainian as they all supported further 
integration with the EU, NATO and emphasized importance of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
unity. It can be seen that during 2014 presidential elections (Fig. 11) regional division became 
almost non-existent as candidates with pro-Western narratives won in each of seven 
participating regions (with exception of Crimea and taking into account low participation of 
East that included Donetsk and Luhansk).     
                                                 
76 See “Dobkin obeshaet Ukraine federalizatsiju i vstuplenie v Tamozhennyi Soyuz,” Ukrainskaja Pravda, 
March 31, 2014, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/03/31/7020915/; “Simonenko hochet, chtoby 
Ukrainia zhila bez presizdenta i v soyze s Rossiei,” Segodnya.ua, April 7, 2014, 
http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/simonenko-hochet-chtoby-ukraina-zhila-bez-prezidenta-i-v-soyuze-s-
rossiey-510729.html   
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       Figure 9. Presidential Elections, 2004. Regional Voting. Additional Round (December 26, 2014). 
 
 
        Figure 10. Presidential Elections, 2010. Regional Voting. Second Round. 
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      Figure 11. Presidential Elections, 2014. Regional Voting. First Round. 
 
 
           Table 1. Presidential Elections, 2014. Regional Voting. First Round. 
 Pro-Western Pro-Russian 
WEST 97.6% 0.3% 
WEST-CENTRAL 96.1% 1.2% 
SOUTHWEST 94.7% 1.9% 
NORTH 94.7% 2.2% 
EAST-CENTRAL 78.4% 15.7% 
EAST 77.8% 12.3% 
SOUTH 87.3% 7.2% 
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Pro-Western Pro-Russian Poroshenko Timoshenko Lyashko Hrytsenko Tihipko Dobkin Rabinovytch Bogomolets Simonenko Tyahnibok
WEST 97.6% 0.3%
Ivano-Frankivsk 97.8% 0.3% 65.1% 14.8% 9.0% 4.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 0.2% 1.8%
Lviv 97.5% 0.3% 69.9% 11.2% 6.8% 5.8% 0.8% 0.1% 0.3% 1.5% 0.2% 1.2%
Ternopil 97.4% 0.3% 60.6% 15.2% 10.1% 7.5% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 1.2% 0.2% 1.9%
WEST-CENTRAL 96.1% 1.2%
Vinnytsia 96.8% 1.1% 67.3% 15.6% 5.5% 4.1% 1.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.6% 0.8%
Rivne 96.2% 0.9% 55.5% 16.0% 13.2% 5.0% 2.0% 0.3% 0.8% 2.0% 0.6% 1.7%
Zhytomyr 95.2% 1.8% 58.6% 15.0% 9.5% 4.4% 3.5% 0.6% 1.4% 1.7% 1.2% 1.1%
Khmelnitsky 95.8% 1.3% 56.2% 16.9% 11.8% 4.7% 2.0% 0.6% 0.9% 1.7% 0.7% 1.6%
Volyn 96.7% 0.9% 52.4% 17.3% 14.5% 6.1% 2.0% 0.4% 0.6% 1.9% 0.5% 1.9%
SOUTHWEST 94.7% 1.9%
Chernivtsi 95.7% 1.1% 56.7% 18.8% 10.5% 3.1% 2.7% 0.4% 1.1% 1.5% 0.7% 1.3%
Transcarpathia 93.6% 2.6% 62.0% 12.9% 7.4% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5% 0.6% 1.3%
NORTH 94.7% 2.2%
Cherkassy 95.8% 1.3% 54.6% 14.0% 11.9% 9.0% 2.2% 0.5% 1.2% 1.6% 0.8% 1.3%
Chernihiv 94.8% 2.5% 44.8% 19.5% 16.6% 6.2% 3.8% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.3% 0.9%
Kyiv city 95.2% 1.5% 64.1% 9.4% 6.6% 7.0% 3.3% 0.7% 1.6% 2.0% 0.8% 1.2%
Kyiv region 96.1% 1.0% 61.6% 13.6% 9.7% 5.1% 2.2% 0.4% 1.1% 1.7% 0.6% 1.1%
Kirovohrad 93.6% 2.8% 50.9% 16.1% 11.5% 5.8% 4.0% 1.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.5% 1.4%
Poltava 93.8% 2.8% 54.5% 13.9% 10.6% 5.5% 4.3% 1.4% 1.9% 1.9% 1.4% 1.2%
Sumy 93.3% 3.6% 55.4% 14.3% 9.3% 5.7% 4.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6% 1.0%
EAST-CENTRAL 78.4% 15.7%
Dnipropetrovsk 85.8% 7.9% 44.7% 9.4% 6.3% 6.3% 10.5% 4.7% 5.1% 2.7% 3.2% 0.8%
Zaporizhzhia 83.3% 10.2% 38.1% 9.7% 4.9% 6.2% 13.7% 6.0% 7.0% 3.0% 4.2% 0.7%
Kharkiv 66.2% 29.0% 35.3% 7.6% 3.9% 4.4% 8.5% 26.3% 3.8% 2.1% 2.7% 0.6%
EAST 77.8% 12.3%
Donetsk 79.2% 11.1% 36.1% 7.6% 2.9% 4.2% 19.6% 6.8% 5.5% 2.6% 4.3% 0.7%
Luhansk 76.3% 13.4% 33.1% 7.7% 6.2% 4.5% 15.7% 8.0% 5.9% 2.4% 5.4% 0.8%
CRIMEA
SOUTH 87.3% 7.2%
Kherson 89.0% 6.1% 48.7% 11.5% 5.9% 5.9% 10.3% 2.7% 3.5% 2.2% 3.4% 1.0%
Mykolaiv 86.8% 8.0% 45.9% 9.7% 5.2% 4.1% 13.1% 4.3% 5.5% 2.5% 3.7% 0.8%
Odesa 86.0% 7.6% 41.8% 9.5% 3.6% 2.9% 18.6% 3.8% 6.2% 2.6% 3.8% 0.8%
2014 Presidential Elections
none
       Table 2. Presidential Elections 2014, First Round. 
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6.3. Pro-Western vs. Pro-Russian Political Parties in 2014 Parliamentary 
Elections and 2015 Local Elections in Ukraine. 
October 2014 parliamentary elections in Ukraine witnessed the lowest turnout in 
history of 52.4% and even western regions with traditionally high voters’ participation 
demonstrated weak activity.77 Donbass region occupied by pro-Russian secessionist forces 
took very limited part in parliamentary election, while Crimea did not vote at all. It was 
estimated that around 4.6 mln people in Ukraine did not or could not vote: 1.8 mln (100% of 
population) in Crimea and Sevastopol, 1.6 mln (49% of population) in Donetsk, and 1.2 mln 
(69% of population) in Luhansk.78 The complicated electoral system during Ukrainian 
parliamentary elections represented mixed proportional first-past-the-post system that meant 
50% (225) of parliamentary seats were distributed during local elections in national multi-
member constituencies based on party lists and other half was distributed during elections in 
single-mandate constituencies when the candidate who got most votes won. For the 
assessment of political parties’ performance, the research uses only results of elections in 
multi-member constituencies.  
According to results of parliamentary elections, there were six parties that gained majority 
of seats in Verkhovnaja Rada (Ukrainian parliament): Petro Poroshenko Bloc (132 seats), 
People’s Front (82 seats), Self-Reliance (33 seats), Opposition Bloc (29 seats), Radical Party 
(22 seats), and Fatherland (19 seats). Amongst these parties the Opposition Bloc was the only 
pro-Russian party and it gained majority in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, however, 
remaining six regions voted for pro-Western parties that gained majority in parliament and 
in December formed government coalition.   
 
 
                                                 
77 Andrew Wilson, “Explaining the Ukraine vote, European Council on Foreign Relations,” October 30, 2014, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/explaining_the_ukraine_vote 
78 “Na vyborah ne smogut progolosovat’ pochti 5 mln ukraintsev,” UNIAN, October 24, 2014, 
http://www.unian.net/politics/1000335-na-vyiborah-ne-smogut-progolosovat-pochti-5-mln-ukraintsev.html 
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Figure 12. Parliamentary Elections, 2014. Multi-Member Districts. 
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     Figure 13. Local Elections 2015 to Regional Councils. 
42 
 
 
 
Local elections took place a year later in October 2015 and turnout was even lower than 
during 2014 parliamentary elections with 46.5% of population participation in elections to 
regional councils and mayors. The other alarming trend was that southern and eastern regions 
demonstrated significantly lower turnout than central and western Ukraine.79 Another 
significant change was that Arseniy Yatsenjuk’s political party People’s Front that was one 
of the leaders during 2014 parliamentary elections lost its all popularity over the year and did 
not take part in local elections being incorporated together with UDAR political party into 
Petro Poroshenko’s Solidarity. There was also a great number of participating parties (Table 
3) that complicated procedure of categorizing them as either pro-Western or pro-Russian 
given the specific nature of local election. Two political parties Our Land and Revival have 
been described as “clones” of Party of Regions introduced in order to distract votes from the 
Opposition Bloc. These parties did not discuss foreign policy or geopolitical orientation in 
their programs specifically focusing on local issues which allowed to classify them in “gray” 
zone which was neither pro-Russian, nor pro-Western. 
Results of local elections demonstrated that pro-Russian Opposition Bloc traditionally 
performed strong in East-Central and South and it got victory in Dnipropetrovsk, 
Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, however, it still did not get majority if to 
compare combined performance of other pro-Western parties.    
 
 
                                                 
79 Andrew Wilson, “Five lessons from the local elections in Ukraine,” European Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 29, 2015, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_five_lessons_from_the_local_elections_in_ukraine4087 
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Pro-Western Pro-Russian Solidarity Fatherland Our Land Opposition Bloc Agrarian Party Radical Party Ukrop Revival Svoboda Samopomosh
WEST 85.40% none
Ivano-Frankivsk 91.67% none 27.38% 21.43% none none none none 14.29% none 19.05% 9.52%
Lviv 78.57% none 23.81% 10.71% none none none 5.95% 7.14% none 14.29% 16.67%
Ternopil 85.95% none 28.13% 15.63% none none none 7.81% 4.69% none 20.31% 9.38%
WEST-CENTRAL 87.17% 9.04%
Vinnytsia 92.84% 7.14% 32.14% 20.24% none 7.14% 7.14% 10.71% 7.14% none 7.14% 8.33%
Rivne 90.63% none 29.69% 25.00% none none none 15.63% 7.81% none 12.50% none
Zhytomyr 81.25% 10.94% 26.56% 20.31% none 10.94% none 9.38% 7.81% none 7.81% 9.38%
Khmelnitsky 77.38% none 20.24% 13.10% none none 13.10% 9.52% none none 11.90% 9.52%
Volyn 93.75% none 20.31% 18.75% 6.25% none none 9.38% 26.56% none 10.94% 7.81%
SOUTHWEST 57.82% 6.25%
Chernivtsi 81.25% 6.25% 23.44% 18.75% 6.25% 6.25% 10.94% 7.81% 6.25% none 6.25% 7.81%
Transcarpathia 34.38% 6.25% 23.44% 10.94% none 6.25% none none none none none none
EAST-CENTRAL 44.76% 29.16%
Dnipropetrovsk 53.34% 38.33% 11.67% 7.50% none 38.33% none 6.67% 20.83% 8.33% none 6.67%
Zaporizhzhia 47.61% 33.33% 15.48% 9.52% 11.90% 33.33% none 7.14% 8.33% none none 7.14%
Kharkiv 33.34% 15.83% 16.67% 6.67% 9.17% 15.83% none none none 41.67% none 10.00%
SOUTH 51.12% 24.75%
Kherson 68.76% 20.31% 28.13% 14.06% 10.94% 20.31% none 9.38% 9.38% none none 7.81%
Mykolaiv 45.32% 26.56% 23.44% 10.94% 15.63% 26.56% none none 10.94% 6.25% none none
Odesa 39.29% 27.38% 26.19% 13.10% 9.52% 27.38% none none none 9.52% none none
NORTH 73.23% 9.73%
Cherkassy 65.47% none 21.43% 15.48% none none none 11.90% 8.33% 9.52% 8.33% none
Chernihiv 76.56% 6.25% 18.75% 17.19% 17.19% 6.25% 14.06% 18.75% 7.81% none none none
Kyiv region 84.51% 7.14% 26.19% 19.05% 8.33% 7.14% none 10.71% 8.33% none 8.33% 11.90%
Kirovohrad 73.45% 20.31% 21.88% 21.88% 6.25% 20.31% none 9.38% 7.81% none 6.25% 6.25%
Poltava 69.04% 7.14% 17.86% 15.48% none 7.14% 8.33% 9.52% 9.52% 7.14% 8.33% none
Sumy 70.32% 7.81% 21.88% 21.88% none 7.81% none 10.94% 7.81% 12.50% 7.81% none
Table 3. Local Elections 2015. Regional Councils. 
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6.4. Ukraine’s Post-Crisis National Identification. 
Prior to 2014 Ukrainian identity split could have been described as division either 
between groups of population that favored Ukraine’s integration with the EU and those who 
supported the CU or between regions that voted for pro-Ukrainian/pro-Western and regions 
who preferred pro-Russian presidential candidates and political parties. In terms of public 
attitude, result of 2014-15 public surveys clearly demonstrated that since the beginning of 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis (i) the EU has become a preferred way for integration even in 
southern Ukraine that traditionally supported the CU, (ii) public approval of Russia has 
significantly gone down and only around 15% of Ukrainians still positively see Russia. 
Results of 2014 presidential elections that were held in the middle of national crisis showed 
unwavering support of pro-Western candidate Petro Poroshenko, while pro-Russian 
candidates got minimum votes all around country. 2014 parliamentary and 2015 local 
elections also showed no unexpected trends with all regions besides eastern Ukraine 
supporting pro-Western political parties.         
As the purpose of first research question has been to determine whether post-crisis Ukraine 
became more consolidated in its political choices and affiliation with European way of 
development, it can be concluded that for majority of Ukrainians the choice between pro-
Western and pro-Russian is no longer relevant. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, war in 
Donbass and bold use of anti-Ukrainian propaganda have resulted in alienation of Ukrainian 
society that would be very difficult to breach.  
At the same time, it should be noted that amongst responses to integration options of “other 
way” or “don’t know” also have got more popular especially in controversial eastern regions 
which indicates that, although, Ukraine has grown more anti-Russian, it has not necessary 
become entirely pro-European. The third option represents an attractive possibility for many 
nationalist groups such as Svoboda party that argues neither for the EU, nor for Russia.  
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Chapter 7. Post-Crisis Democratic Consolidation in Ukraine: Political Parties 
and Acceptance of Democracy. 
Following theoretic works on democracy and national unity by Rustow and Martinez-
Herrera, it can be expected that emergence of more consolidated Ukrainian identification 
with the European Union would have positively influenced the state of democratic 
consolidation in Ukraine. In particular, what can be excepted is Martinez-Herrera’s non-
recursive relationship between Ukrainian identification with pro-European political 
community, “common good perception” (the EU membership), “political community pride” 
(realization of Ukrainian sovereignty distinctive from the one of Russia) and increasing 
support of democracy.80 In order to assess the state of post-crisis democratic consolidation in 
Ukraine it has been decided to focus on two main dimensions party system and mass 
acceptance of democracy which have been frequently described as important indicators of 
the consolidation process. If political parties are good indicator of how the process of 
democratic consolidation is going at the “top” among elites (or constitutional dimension 
according to Linz and Stepan), then public support of democracy shows how wide democratic 
norms have spread (or attitudinal dimension).  
7.1. Ukrainian Political Party System after the Crisis. 
Despite many arguments about what are the better methods of measuring democratic 
consolidation, almost everyone agrees that party system is one of the most important 
indicators of how the consolidation process proceeds and whether it would be successful. 
There are certain characteristics that describe the kind of party system that would be 
conductive to democratic consolidation such as autonomy from other state institutions, 
internal democracy, transparency and its basis in the society.81    
                                                 
80 Martinez-Herrera, “Competing National Identities and Democratization: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis,” 91-93. 
81 See Pridham, “Southern European democracies on the road to consolidation: a comparative assessment of 
the role of political parties,” 1-42. 
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Ukrainian party system has been renewed after the latest parliamentary elections in 2014 that 
resulted in the overwhelming victory of pro-European parties that proceeded to form 
governmental coalition in December 2014. There were six main political parties that emerged 
from 2014 elections. Petro Poroshenko Bloc (PPB) or Solidarity was the party that gained 
most seats (132) in parliament, although it came second to People’s Front (due to peculiarities 
of Ukrainian combined electoral system that is mix of proportional and first-past-the-post 
voting). The leader during 2014 parliamentary and 2015 local elections Solidarity has been 
described as pro-European party with very wide membership that included not only Kyiv’s 
mayor Vitaliy Klitschko’s party UDAR but also many people from Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions.82 Solidarity has been responsible for negotiating Minsk ceasefire on Ukrainian 
behalf and has been one of the few pro-Western parties that insisted on peaceful solution of 
Donbass conflict.83 Ex-Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk’s People’s Front got most national 
votes (22.14%) during 2014 elections but gained only 82 seats in the parliament. People’s 
Front was pro-European but negotiated use of force in Donbass conflict. Following a year 
after 2014 elections, People’s Front popularity rapidly fell mostly due to decreasing popular 
support of Prime Minister Yatsenjuk who retired in April 2016. People’s Front did not take 
stand in 2015 local elections instead partly incorporating into Solidarity. Andriy Sadovyi’s 
Self-Reliance party was named the biggest winner of 2014 elections due to its triumphant 
performance in central and western Ukraine. Self-Reliance got 33 seats, it also approved of 
EU membership but was mostly oriented towards domestic problems. The only pro-Russian 
party Yuri Boiko’s Opposition Bloc came fourth during 2014 elections getting 29 seats and 
advocating against EU membership and for peaceful solution of Donbass conflict. In 2015 
local elections Opposition Bloc gained first place in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv 
and Odesa. Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party gained 22 seats during 2014 elections and built its 
program on radical right populism and use of force in Donbass, while supporting EU 
                                                 
82 “Bolshe vsego regionalov ‘prijutil’ Bloc Petra Poroshenko,” ZN.UA, October 29, 2015, 
http://zn.ua/VYBORY2015/bolshe-vsego-eks-regionalov-priyutil-blok-petra-poroshenko-192832_.html  
83 European Parliament, “Ukraine: political parties and the EU,” January 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/545714/EPRS_ATA%282015%29545714_REV
1_EN.pdf  
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membership. Finally, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland came sixth during 2014 presidential 
elections gaining only 19 seats but recovered in a year coming strong second after the 
Solidarity during 2015 local elections. For a long time Tymoshenko and her supporters have 
been advocates for EU membership.           
Parliamentary elections of 2014 introduced pro-European parties that gained majority in 
parliament with marginalized pro-Russian Opposition Bloc holding insignificant number of 
seats. However, dominating pro-European discourse of Ukrainian political parties after the 
beginning of Ukrainian crisis did not compensate for various problematic trends that have 
continued to dominate Ukrainian political system.  
Political party system is considered strong if it demonstrates a significant degree of autonomy 
from other branches of power, however, in Ukraine it has been problematic to say that 
executive does not control legislature. Similar to other political parties in the post-Soviet 
space, Ukrainian party system was and remains under-institutionalized and highly 
personalized when party’s survival much depends on its political leader.84 As much as 
Solidarity is associated with incumbent President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, other 
political parties are also structured around their leaders. Fatherland was created by ex-Prime 
Minister and political prisoner under Yanukovych’s regime Yulia Tymoshenko and Radical 
Party was built in the image of its eccentric leader Oleg Lyashko. So it is hard to talk about 
consolidated party system given its personality-based structure. Moreover, as main power 
struggle in Ukraine lately has been occurring between President Poroshenko and ex-Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk the projection of their conflict has been observed in legislature 
where Poroshenko and Yatsenjuk appointed their loyal supporters using quota system. 
Poroshenko’s people have had control over eleven ministries and eleven parliamentary 
committees, while Yatsenjuk’s interests until recently were represented in four ministries and 
                                                 
84 Max Bader, “Party Politics in Georgia and Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assistance,” 
Democratization 17, no. 6 (2010), 1097-99. 
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eight parliamentary committees.85 Internal democracy and transparency have also always 
been problematic features for Ukrainian party system, although, not as much as for its 
neighbour Russia.86 In many ways, it is a result of all-pervasive corruption that still remains 
the biggest problem of Ukraine, according to public surveys and experts’ opinion. It has been 
noted many times that politics and business are very closely interrelated in Ukraine and the 
role of large business-owners (oligarchs) in Ukrainian politics has always been large. There 
were certain expectations that after Euromaidan and regime’s change oligarchy would not be 
as influential as during Yanukovych’ rule in 2010-13 but there are many signs that oligarchs 
still remain a significant factor in politics. Although the composition of powerful oligarchs 
might have changed, oligarchic factor remains stable due to continuity of informal networks 
and flexibility of their political loyalties.87 Finally, as political party is supposed to serve as 
linkage between elites and society, it is important that political parties remain “rooted” in 
society offering channels of participation and representing attitudes of peoples. It is also 
highly difficult in Ukraine as, according to Razumkov Centre, in 2015 only 13% of 
Ukrainians expressed trust in political parties, while 75% of Ukrainians were highly 
skeptical.88    
It can be considered that Ukraine still continues to have a weak party system with many 
impediments for party development remaining in place: Soviet political culture, corruption, 
weak institutionalization, lack of internal democracy and lack of clear ideologies.89 While 
there is no genuine changes in Ukrainian political party system, it is difficult to foresee any 
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significant improvement in quality of democracy as political parties remain key agents of 
new regime’s consolidation. 
7.2. Ukraine and Mass Acceptance of Democracy. 
 Unlike political party system, attitudes of people to democracy is more reflective of 
how well the attitudinal component of democratic consolidation is going or whether 
democracy is becoming the only appropriate form of government. It can be seen from IRI 
surveys in 2015 (Fig. 14) that in the choice between prosperity and democracy three out of 
six regions that took part in survey preferred democracy. West, West-Central and Southwest 
Ukraine decided that democracy was more important, while North, South and East-Central 
chose prosperity. In 2016, however, only West and West-Central (Fig. 15) still went with 
democracy, while other regions decided economic well-being was more important. 
Moreover, the overall figures of support for democracy went down especially in Southwest 
where support for democracy dropped almost by half and South where democracy lost around 
10% in a year. Mass acceptance of democracy is important indicator of democratic 
consolidation, however, it seems to be weakening in Ukraine as people start to look around 
for more socioeconomic stability. Such trend is understandable given the rough period 
Ukraine is going through. Pridham wrote that in times of democratisation it is easy to confuse 
between process of democratic transition and instability that emerges as a result of 
breakdown of old regime and conflict between demands for changes and elites’ resistance to 
such changes.90 The instability that always emerges when old regime collapses is not a result 
of democratisation per se but the public can perceive demand for democracy as one of factors 
of instability which is something that many are concerned can happen in Ukraine. Although 
there have been attempts to limit state-owned Russian mass media in Ukraine, most of the 
population still an easy access to Russian TV shows and news that explain poor economic 
situation in Ukraine as a result of Euromaidan in 2013 and end of Yanukovych’s regime.    
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7.3. 2016: Many Dangers for Democratic Consolidation in Ukraine. 
Analysis of democratic consolidation in Ukraine in early 2016 gives a lot of reasons 
for concern even if to focus only on two indicators such as political party system and public 
support of democracy and ignore many other alarming signs such as lack of trust in 
governmental institutions, increasingly non-democratic actions of Poroshenko, forced 
retirement of Yatsenjuk and non-weakening corruption. The research has attempted to look 
at democratic consolidation from two-side perspective – to assess political elites by looking 
at political party system and attitude of people towards democracy by looking at opinion 
polls.  
Ukrainian political system has always been characterized by power struggle between large 
political-financial clans and, sadly, this process still goes on today as Ukrainian political life 
has been divided in power struggle between Poroshenko and Yatsenjuk’s groups. Such 
feature of political life has been a major factor in the formation of party system before and 
after Euromaidan and Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Oligarchical factor remains active and 
parties are still weak institutions focused around their leaders which does not allow to 
consider party system in Ukraine as autonomous political actor that ensures linkage function 
between society and elites. Public support for democracy has also somewhat wavered, 
although, such disappointment can be explained by unfavorable and unstable economic 
environment that has been in Ukraine since the new government that has impacted all social 
groups. It might seem strange to see why public survey formulated the dilemma in terms of 
“prosperity” vs. “democracy” as these are not antagonistic terms but it is understandable in 
the context of Russian-Ukrainian crisis and Russian rhetoric where pro-democratic political 
changes are inevitably tied to poverty and political instability which has for long been one of 
Russia’s strategies in fighting against so-called “colour revolutions” in its vicinity.91    
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Chapter 8. Post-Crisis Ukraine. 
 “Ukrainian politics is like circus with horses,  
however, in my opinion circus is still better than swamp”92. 
Julia Latynina, journalist 
 
Following trip to Ukraine in April 2016, Russian journalist Julia Latynina has 
described Ukrainian politics as “circus” based on observation of local and national political 
struggles. At first sight, it might seem unflattering but for many experts Ukrainian turbulent 
political life is still more preferable to Russia’s “swamp” where for a long time there has 
been no alternative to ruling coalition of siloviki (people from Soviet and later Russian 
Security Service) with Putin as their leader. Ukraine’s political instability and inability to 
consolidate neither authoritarian nor democratic regime has been cited as both blessing and 
curse of modern Ukraine. There have been certain hopes the Euromaidan and Revolution of 
Dignity in 2013 would be that final factor that would push Ukraine towards consolidated 
democracy. Russian annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbass has become a major 
problem for post-Maidan Ukraine, however, even such disaster could have its benefits in 
terms of finally solving Ukrainian dilemma of where it should look eastward or westward. 
Two years later in 2016 this has been an attempt to analyze what were the consequences of 
turbulent 2014 year for Ukrainian national identity and process of democratic consolidation.     
8.1. Becoming Ukrainian. Ukraine’s Post-2014 National Identity. 
In post-structuralist discourse theory any identity-based narrative is dualistic as it 
always should include not only promise of pleasure/fullness but also inevitably feeling of 
absence/lack that is caused by some Other.93 Nationalist discourses also need both promise 
of Golden Age and some enemy who would be responsible for the feeling of incompleteness 
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and against whom nations identify themselves. In the end in post-structuralism the meaning 
of each signifier is rooted in its difference from other signifiers. “Cat” is a “cat” because 
ultimately it is not a “dog” and not because there is, for example, some absolute idea of cat 
as Plato would suggest. As one of scholars in discourse theory Yannis Stavrakakis noticed, 
“Identity construction – this process of managing the semblance of a stable and complete 
identity – ultimately depends on the ability of a discourse to explain (and/or mask) its lack 
of fullness and completeness”94. Following in the post-structuralist tradition, Russia has 
made a great contribution to the construction of modern Ukrainian identity by providing 
narrative of Other against which Ukraine would be identifying its nation. This research has 
explored changes in Ukrainian identity using the framework of pro-Russian/pro-Western 
dichotomy which to a certain degree is a simplified picture of Ukrainians’ attitude but it still 
can make useful contribution in regards to how previously pro-Russian regions feel about the 
EU and Western democracy. 
Ukrainian nation-building has been such a complex process for a large part because Ukraine 
is located at the border of European and Russian powers both of whom have exerted their 
influence on the country. Such cross-cultural influence has resulted in divided loyalties in 
Ukraine where western and central regions are more nationalistic and EU-oriented, while 
eastern and southern regions still feel strong pull towards Russia. In the condition of 
democratic transition, such identity split is a factor of constant instability that prevents 
transition from reaching its final stage of consolidation. 2014 Russian-Ukrainian crisis could 
have been a possible solution to the identity split as after losing Crimea and Donbass to 
Russia Ukraine has finally rejected idea of Russian World (Russkiy Mir) and opted to look 
to the EU instead. Although, Ukraine has not become entirely consolidated in its pro-Western 
orientation, it does seem less divided in its identity split.  
Public surveys and results of elections have demonstrated that, although pro-Russian political 
actors and parties retain significant influence in eastern and partly southern regions, support 
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has gone much lower. Only East has demonstrated persistent support for integration with the 
Customs Union and has voted for Opposition Bloc during 2014 parliamentary elections. 
There has been, however, almost equal support for the EU integration and it has been highly 
doubtful that 2014 elections in Donetsk and Luhansk were free and fair given extensive 
resources of Party of Regions and Russia and lack of independent observers in conflict 
lands.95 Another interesting detail is, though, East seems to prefer pro-Russian integration in 
comparison with the EU membership, it is the only region whose first option is “don’t know” 
in response to integration question in 2015. 
At the same time, many authors are concerned that support of EU integration may not last 
much longer hindered by growing disappointment with domestic reforms of pro-EU 
politicians in Ukraine and unclear signals from the EU itself.96 The EU’s policy in Ukraine 
within the framework of EaP (Eastern Partnership) has been discussed quite a lot and one of 
most popular criticisms has been that EaP lacks in motivation side such as future membership 
in the EU. In April 2014 the Netherlands hosted referendum on whether to remove trade 
barriers with Ukraine essentially implying closer partnership of the EU and Ukraine and 61% 
of voters voted against it.97 The result has been interpreted in more than one way as many 
experts have pointed out low turnout (32%) and non-binding nature of this vote that did not 
put any obligations on Dutch government.98 Nevertheless, this victory of Eurosceptics has 
sent a certain message to Ukraine such as its potential European membership seems to be in 
a very distant future if ever.                  
                                                 
95 “Why are Ukraine separatist election controversial?,” BBC, November 1, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29831028 
96 Maksim Vikhrov, “Posle Gollandii. Kak menjaetsja otnoshenie ukraintsev k evrointegratsii,” Moscow 
Center of Carnegie, April 29, 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/04/29/ru-63464/ixrz  
97 “Netherlands Rejects EU-Ukraine Partnership Deal,” BBC, April 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-35976086 
98 Anna Holligan, “Dutch Dilemma,” BBC, April 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35984821  
55 
 
 
 
8.2. Democratic Consolidation in Post-2014 Ukraine. 
The second research question has been concerned with whether more consolidated 
pro-European identification of Ukrainian nation would act as strengthening factor for 
democratic consolidation as many theories would suggest. Unlike the first research question, 
there is no definitive positive answer to this question. There is of course an issue of time 
limitation as democratic consolidation takes decades and it is unlikely to be correctly assessed 
two years after the beginning of transition. However, because Ukraine has already been on 
this path of democratic transition in 2004, there is a possibility to see whether the same 
institutional weaknesses and incapable political elites would prevent the process of 
consolidation in Ukraine and would weakened identification with Russia act as a constrainer 
on the rollback of democracy in Ukraine this time. Democratisation studies suggest that 
democracy happens either because of benevolent structural conditions or conscious decisions 
of political actors (either elites or people). Socioeconomic conditions in 2016 in Ukraine so 
far have been far from conductive to democratisation and the results of second research 
question demonstrate that elites have continued in their irresponsible manner engaging in 
power struggles and corruption perpetuating weak political party system. It can be concluded 
that if Ukraine has hope for genuine democratic consolidation, it would happen only from 
the “bottom” because of the role of multiple NGOs and civil society that perhaps are the 
strongest in Ukraine compared to other post-communist societies (with exception of Baltic 
states). However, results of public surveys have also demonstrated a large dissatisfaction of 
public with performance of state institutions, reforms and political parties and low voter 
turnout in parliamentary elections 2014 and local elections 2015 are warning signs that public 
have lost its enthusiasm for political transition and trust in political authorities.99 In any other 
ex-communist country, such dissatisfaction would likely result in more passive political 
behavior, however, history of modern Ukraine allows to suggest that opposite can happen 
such as, for example, new Maidan.    
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It should be admitted that so far in 2016 pro-European turn of Ukrainian society and more 
consolidated national identification (attitudinal component of democratic consolidation) have 
been less influential to the process of democratisation in comparison with weak and corrupted 
elites and their incapacity to proceed with transparent democratic decision-making 
(constitutional component). Problem of post-communist elites is a well-known one and there 
have been many studies about how it impedes democratisation. The one way to get out of 
informal networks of corruption in Ukraine is to introduce new people which has been 
partially done by Petro Poroshenko when he introduced citizens of Georgia and Baltic states 
to take key positions in Ukrainian ministries.100 Following scandalous resignation of one of 
them economic minister Aivaras Abromavičius allowed to make obvious conclusions about 
level of corruption in these institutions.101 However, such external actors also can be “wild” 
cards in Ukrainian politics as they are not deeply affiliated with Ukrainian groups of interest. 
Certainly they do not have much political influence with the only exception of former 
Georgian president and personal enemy of Putin Mikheil Saakashvili who has been Governor 
of Odesa since 2015. Starting fight against infamous Odesa’s corruption and making enemies 
with Prime Minister Yatsenjuk, Saakashvili has gained a wide recognition by Ukrainian 
people being one of the popular politicians in early 2016.102 Such “wild” card can play out 
unexpectedly in next cycle of Ukrainian elections and possibly even break the established 
trajectory of post-revolutionary political development in Ukraine where the mass protests are 
always the highest point of democratic expectations followed by growing disappointment 
with political elites’ choices.  
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Appendix 
 
     Table 4. Support for integration processes on national level, 2014-2015. 
 European Union Customs Union Other Difficult to answer 
Mar-12 36% 43% 4% 17% 
May-12 37% 41% 5% 17% 
Sep-12 32% 42% 6% 20% 
May-13 40% 37% 5% 18% 
Sep-13 42% 37% 5% 17% 
Feb-14 41% 36% 9% 14% 
Mar-14 52% 27% 6% 14% 
Apr-14 53% 24% 10% 13% 
Sep-14 59% 17% 9% 15% 
Jul-15 55% 14% 12% 20% 
Sep-15 57% 17% 12% 14% 
 
      Table 5. Support for integration processes, regional level, March 2014 
 European Union Customs Union Other Difficult to answer 
WEST 90% 3% 2% 5% 
CENTER 70% 9% 11% 10% 
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SOUTH 29% 37% 10% 24% 
EAST 20% 59% 3% 12% 
 
      Table 6. Support for integration processes, regional level, April 2014 
 European Union Customs Union Other Difficult to answer 
WEST 82% 2% 3% 12% 
CENTER 69% 10% 9% 12% 
SOUTH 28% 32% 19% 21% 
EAST 27% 53% 10% 10% 
 
        Table 7. Support for integration processes, regional level, July 2015 
 European Union Customs Union Other Difficult to answer 
WEST 83% 4% 6% 8% 
CENTER 58% 8% 12% 22% 
SOUTH 48% 18% 18% 16% 
EAST 26% 28% 12% 34% 
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    Table 8. Attitude towards Russia and EU, March 2014 
 Warm Neutral Cold Don't know 
Russia 31% 21% 45% 2% 
European Union 46% 31% 22% 1% 
 
  Table 9. Attitude towards Russia and EU, April 2014 
 Warm Neutral Cold Don't know 
Russia 15% 17% 66% 2% 
European Union 48% 38% 11% 3% 
 
     Table 10. Attitude towards Russia and EU, July 2015 
 Very Warm/Warm Neutral Very Cold/Cold Difficult to answer 
Russia 16% 28% 51% 5% 
European Union 45% 41% 9% 5% 
 
  Table 11. Attitude towards Russia and EU, September 2015 
 Very Warm/Warm Neutral Very Cold/Cold Difficult to answer 
Russia 17% 20% 61% 2% 
European Union 51% 35% 12% 2% 
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Table 12. Presidential Elections, 2004. Additional Round (December 26, 2014). 
 Pro-Western (Yushchenko) Pro-Russian (Yanukovych) 
WEST 95.1% 3.4% 
Ivano-Frankivsk 95.7% 2.9% 
Lviv 93.7% 4.7% 
Ternopil 96.0% 2.7% 
WEST-CENTRAL 81.3% 15.4% 
Vinnytsia 84.0% 12.9% 
Rivne 84.5% 12.3% 
Zhytomyr 66.8% 28.9% 
Khmelnitsky 80.4% 16.0% 
Volyn 90.7% 7.0% 
SOUTHWEST 73.6% 22.0% 
Chernivtsi 79.7% 16.4% 
Transcarpathia 67.4% 27.6% 
NORTH 74.3% 21.5% 
Cherkassy 79.1% 17.3% 
Chernihiv 71.1% 24.2% 
Kyiv city 78.3% 17.5% 
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Kyiv region 82.7% 13.7% 
Kirovohrad 63.4% 31.8% 
Poltava 66.0% 29.1% 
Sumy 79.4% 16.9% 
EAST-CENTRAL 27.6% 66.4% 
Dnipropetrovsk 32.0% 61.1% 
Zaporizhzhia 24.5% 70.1% 
Kharkiv 26.3% 68.1% 
EAST 5.2% 92.4% 
Donetsk 4.2% 93.6% 
Luhansk 6.2% 91.2% 
CRIMEA 15.4% 81.2% 
SOUTH 32.8% 61.7% 
Kherson 43.4% 51.3% 
Mykolaiv 27.7% 67.1% 
Odesa 27.4% 66.6% 
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          Table 13. Presidential Elections, 2010. Regional Voting. Second Round. 
 Pro-Western (Tymoshenko) Pro-Russian (Yanukovych) 
WEST 87.8% 7.8% 
Ivano-Frankivsk 88.9% 7.0% 
Lviv 86.2% 8.6% 
Ternopil 88.4% 7.9% 
WEST-CENTRAL 71.3% 23.7% 
Vinnytsia 71.1% 24.2% 
Rivne 76.2% 18.9% 
Zhytomyr 57.5% 36.7% 
Khmelnitsky 69.7% 24.9% 
Volyn 81.8% 14.0% 
SOUTHWEST 59.0% 34.6% 
Chernivtsi 66.4% 27.6% 
Transcarpathia 51.6% 41.5% 
NORTH 62.2% 31.1% 
Cherkassy 65.3% 28.8% 
Chernihiv 63.6% 30.9% 
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Kyiv city 65.3% 25.7% 
Kyiv region 69.7% 23.6% 
Kirovohrad 54.6% 39.6% 
Poltava 54.2% 38.9% 
Sumy 62.9% 30.4% 
EAST-CENTRAL 24.6% 68.5% 
Dnipropetrovsk 29.1% 62.7% 
Zaporizhzhia 22.2% 71.5% 
Kharkiv 22.4% 71.3% 
EAST 7.1% 89.7% 
Donetsk 6.4% 90.4% 
Luhansk 7.7% 88.9% 
CRIMEA 17.3% 78.2% 
SOUTH 25.4% 68.5% 
Kherson 33.7% 59.9% 
Mykolaiv 22.9% 71.5% 
Odesa 19.5% 74.1% 
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          Table 14. Presidential Elections, 2014. Regional Voting. First Round. 
 Pro-Western Pro-Russian 
WEST 97.6% 0.3% 
WEST-CENTRAL 96.1% 1.2% 
SOUTHWEST 94.7% 1.9% 
NORTH 94.7% 2.2% 
EAST-CENTRAL 78.4% 15.7% 
EAST 77.8% 12.3% 
SOUTH 87.3% 7.2% 
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Pro-Western Pro-Russian PP Bloc People's Front Self-Reliance Opposition Bloc Radical Fatherland
WEST 81.40% 0.62%
Ivano-Frankivsk 81.46% 0.54% 18.25% 37.48% 14.69% 0.54% 4.85% 6.19%
Lviv 82.31% 0.71% 20.42% 33.03% 18.78% 0.71% 5.35% 4.73%
Ternopil 80.43% 0.61% 19.73% 36.50% 11.30% 0.61% 6.59% 6.31%
WEST-CENTRAL 78.44% 2.20%
Vinnytsia 80.14% 2.26% 37.45% 22.41% 7.59% 2.26% 6.09% 6.60%
Rivne 79.16% 1.75% 24.21% 29.31% 11.08% 1.75% 7.91% 6.65%
Zhytomyr 75.69% 3.30% 23.03% 26.39% 9.12% 3.30% 10.63% 6.52%
Khmelnitsky 78.44% 2.23% 24.98% 26.09% 10.39% 2.23% 9.33% 7.65%
Volyn 78.75% 1.47% 16.89% 33.22% 11.46% 1.47% 9.70% 7.48%
SOUTHWEST 76.83% 2.63%
Chernivtsi 78.39% 2.85% 21.20% 32.39% 8.56% 2.85% 8.79% 7.45%
Transcarpathia 75.26% 2.41% 28.05% 25.63% 9.63% 2.41% 6.83% 5.12%
EAST-CENTRAL 46.86% 26.20%
Dnipropetrovsk 52.56% 24.27% 19.48% 12.24% 8.59% 24.27% 7.59% 4.66%
Zaporizhzhia 46.97% 22.18% 16.94% 10.91% 8.59% 22.18% 5.92% 4.61%
Kharkiv 41.05% 32.16% 15.17% 8.13% 7.49% 32.16% 6.38% 3.88%
SOUTH 53.68% 14.77%
Kherson 59.76% 10.39% 22.26% 16.14% 6.70% 10.39% 8.98% 5.68%
Mykolaiv 54.82% 15.88% 20.64% 14.04% 7.71% 15.88% 7.78% 4.65%
Odesa 46.47% 18.05% 19.63% 9.76% 7.23% 18.05% 5.41% 4.44%
NORTH 74.16% 4.28%
Cherkassy 75.61% 2.76% 22.50% 26.79% 9.83% 2.76% 10.05% 6.44%
Chernihiv 72.43% 3.88% 21.46% 19.49% 7.63% 3.88% 16.42% 7.43%
Kyiv city 72.80% 3.69% 23.95% 18.70% 21.39% 3.69% 3.54% 5.22%
Kyiv region 79.13% 2.67% 24.28% 28.25% 13.13% 2.67% 6.91% 6.56%
Kirovohrad 73.30% 7.00% 21.73% 23.66% 7.90% 7.00% 11.67% 8.34%
Poltava 72.86% 5.33% 23.24% 23.33% 9.22% 5.33% 10.85% 6.22%
Sumy 72.98% 4.64% 25.09% 21.81% 8.28% 4.64% 10.61% 7.19%
EAST 33.70% 37.64%
Donetsk 34.30% 38.69% 18.22% 6.14% 3.85% 38.69% 4.14% 1.95%
Luhansk 33.09% 36.59% 14.32% 5.94% 5.14% 36.59% 5.36% 2.33%
Table 15. Parliamentary Elections, 2014. 
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Democracy Prosperity
WEST 56% 30%
Ivano-Frankivsk 47% 34%
Lviv 57% 29%
Ternopil 65% 27%
WEST-CENTRAL 46% 38%
Vinnytsia 48% 34%
Rivne 57% 31%
Zhytomyr 36% 45%
Khmelnitsky 43% 41%
SOUTHWEST 50% 28%
Chernivtsi 50% 28%
EAST-CENTRAL 29% 55%
Dnipropetrovsk 34% 49%
Zaporizhzhia 29% 64%
Kharkiv 25% 51%
SOUTH 32% 51%
Kherson 35% 44%
Mykolaiv 26% 56%
Odesa 35% 54%
NORTH 35% 46%
Cherkassy 37% 47%
Chernihiv 29% 60%
Kyiv city 46% 37%
Kirovohrad 41% 35%
Poltava 31% 47%
Sumy 27% 52%
Democracy Prosperity
WEST 52% 34%
Ivano-Frankivsk 53% 31%
Lviv 51% 36%
Ternopil 52% 35%
WEST-CENTRAL 44% 36%
Vinnytsia 44% 30%
Rivne 44% 29%
Zhytomyr 45% 35%
Khmelnitsky 41% 49%
SOUTHWEST 29% 51%
Chernivtsi 29% 51%
EAST-CENTRAL 27% 57%
Dnipropetrovsk 26% 55%
Zaporizhzhia 36% 59%
Kharkiv 20% 56%
SOUTH 21% 63%
Kherson 26% 58%
Mykolaiv 13% 71%
Odesa 25% 59%
NORTH 29% 52%
Cherkassy 36% 46%
Chernihiv 13% 64%
Kyiv city 39% 46%
Kirovohrad 32% 48%
Poltava 32% 50%
Sumy 24% 59%
      Table 16. IRI's Municipal Poll 2015.   Table 17. IRI's Municipal Poll 2016. 
